Towards a Political Economy of Competition in Finance and Development by Leonardo Burlamaqui & Jan Kregel
Towards a Political Economy of Competition in Finance and 
Development:  




March 2003; Revised, June 2003 
 
Schumpeterian creation and destruction occurs in finance as well as in products and 
processes. The essential point of Schumpeter’s view of money and banks is that new 
combinations in production and in products could not appear without being financed: 
finance and development are in a symbiotic relation. Restricting the Schumpeterian 
vision to technology or even industrial organization misses the integrated character of 
Schumpeter’s vision. (Hyman Minsky, 1990)  
                                                          
 
1. Introduction  
 
  This paper uses the ideas of Schumpeter and Minsky to examine, from a political 
economy perspective – conceived as the study of the interdependence of economics, policy and 
politics and opposed to a “financial economics” one –  the role of finance in economic growth.
2  
The paper also tries to articulate these theorists’ ideas within a knowledge-based perspective on  
firms that has been developed by Penrose and Chandler, among others. In this knowledge-based 
approach two aspects of the role of financial firms in economic growth and dynamics are 
important. One is the crucial role played by financial firms in providing manufacturing firms 
with the credit they require to engage in the competitive process of creative destruction. The 
second is the competitive behavior of financial firms themselves, which transforms financial 
markets and, in turn, affects the ability of all firms to finance new innovations. The uncertainty 
and risk that underlie Minsky’s financial fragility hypothesis are seen to result from 
Schumpeterian innovation, and spur further innovations. And knowledge-based innovation is a 
key strategic response to an environment of uncertainty and financial instability: Financial 
innovations that facilitate the financing of innovation in business tend to decrease transparency 
concerning the risks being borne in the system, raising the possibility of ever-increasing financial 
risks and ever-decreasing understanding of the extent of these risks. 
  
  These considerations suggest that developing countries should be given the means to 
mold national financial structures which best facilitate the growth of knowledge-absorbing 
sectors (Christensen, 1992, Nelson, 1993), given their economic and social structures, their 
historical trajectories, and their institutional inheritances. But this does not mean that each nation 
will be able to identify a single financial model that facilitates growth and minimizes risks at 
every point in its development process. Growth requires financing, and both the process of 
growth and the process of financing growth are inherently volatile and unstable, as both 
 
1 This paper is based on a larger research project entitled “Finance, Competition, Instability, and 
Development: The Microfoundations and Financial Scaffolding of the Economy,” which was 
presented at a meeting of the Other Canon Foundation in Oslo, August 16, 2000. 
2 Minsky, while a noted Post Keynesian, often commented on the affinity of Schumpeter’s and 
Keynes’ views on finance; see Minsky (1986, p.113) and Minsky (1990). 
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  The next section briefly sketches out two approaches to the firm inspired by the ideas of 
Schumpeter and Minsky. The two sections that follow then summarize Schumpeter’s and 
Minsky’s ideas about the role of finance in economic dynamics, in light of these ideas about the 
firm. Competition and innovation in the financial sector are discussed, followed by attention to 
the impact of globalization, especially on developing nations. A discussion of policy implications 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Schumpeter and Minsky on the Firm: Knowledge-Based and Cash-Flow Approaches 
 
  The Knowledge-Based Approach to the Firm . Schumpeter understood capitalism as 
an historical process whose defining feature is not equilibrium (as in the neoclassical canon), but 
change. Chandler (1990) validates Schumpeter’s conception by providing historical chronicles 
that illustrate how firms compete in market settings. He shows that firms engage in ongoing 
struggles not simply to survive, but to achieve and hold dominant market positions. In these 
struggles, continuous change and unforeseen circumstances are the most significant threats to 
firms’ survival.  
 
  A key element of the firm, emphasized by Chandler and by other theorists in different 
ways, is the creation and strategic management of knowledge-based resources. These resources 
include individual employees, teams, processes, and technologies. Some firm resources are 
acquired through arms-length purchases (as when new employees are hired); others are 
developed through processes internal to the firm. Firm managers’ strategic management involves 




  Different authors exploring the knowledge-based theory of firm organization have 
emphasized different aspects of firm behavior. Chandler views managerial organisation itself as 
a production technique that confers “first mover” advantages. Edith Penrose (1959 [1995]) 
emphasizes that firms are not only more efficient in organizing factors, they are more efficient in 
developing new techniques which cope with changes in uncertain environments. They 
accomplish this by creating internal environments -- “pools of relative certainty” – capable of 
combining and coordinating responses to external volatility, and thereby generating endogenous 
innovations. These are just two ideas of many that have been proposed regarding how firms react 
to changing, uncertain environments. A fuller accounting of these responses would include 
adaptations in the existing management and organization of production, and changes in the 
organisation itself (Best, 1990, Lazonick, 1991, and Chandler et al, 1997).  
 
  In any event, firms that survive invariably innovate – that is, they exploit opportunities 
for change by applying new ideas, methods, or combinations of resources.
4 Further, the 
                                                           
3 A longer version of this paper (available from the authors) shows how this strategic management 
involves considering when and how to reduce the uncertainty that arises from relative price instability by 
shifting from the use of contracted services to the hiring of employees. These considerations, of course, 
build on the core insights of Coase (1937 [1991]). 
4 This does not mean the application of “best practices,” as Nelson and Winter (1982), Paul David (1985), 
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acts to reinforce uncertainty and instability, calling forth new reactions and innovations and 
leading to self-perpetuating economic change. Firms thus compete continuously for market 
advantages, with asymmetric results: success for some, with strengthened technological and 
organizational capabilities, and above-average profits; failure for other firms, which either 
disappear or are reduced to marginal activities. Schumpeter, whose core ideas are elaborated by 
these theorists, put it as follows: “to escape being undersold, every firm is compelled to follow 
suit, to invest, and to accumulate” (Schumpeter: 1942 [1992] chapter 3: 32).  
 
  Competition is therefore the struggle for survival and growth in a structurally uncertain 
environment (Nelson and Winter: 1982, parts 2 and 5). The profits that result from dominant 
market positions are always under threat from imitative strategies or other firms’ innovative 
behaviors; they can only be maintained by continuous product differentiation and productivity 
enhancement. The continuous competition for profit provides the dynamic connection between 
innovations, market structures and business and organizational strategies.  
 
  The Cash-Flow Approach to the Firm. Minsky’s analysis of the firm emphasizes the 
firm’s cash flows and their sustainability in light of the borrowing required to acquire assets. 
Borrowing the concept of a “margin of safety” from Benjamin Graham, one of the originators of 
hedge fund investment, Minsky defines three balance sheet configurations: hedge, speculative 
and Ponzi. The asset side of a “hedge” balance sheet produces expected cash inflows that always 
exceed their financing costs and operating expenses, including dividends, by a margin capable of 
absorbing any unforeseen changes in cash inflows and outflows. If the liquidity cushion covers, 
say, 2.33 standard deviations of the historical data on past gross operating returns, then the firm 
would be unable to meet its cash flow commitments on average only one time in a hundred. A 
company that can meet its payments with 99% probability is close to what a banker considers 
risk-free – a hedge unit. 
 
As the cushion of safety declines, the probability of being unable to meet cash flow 
commitments rises; at some point it will be 99% probable that in some future periods the firm’s 
cushion will not be sufficient to meet its payment commitments. Nonetheless, the cumulative 
cushion over the life of the loan should be sufficient to cover them; so the project has a positive 
expected net present value. The firm may need an additional extension of short-term credit on 
occasion to meet its cash payments, but by the end of the project the loan it will have been fully 
serviced. This is what Minsky calls a “speculative” financing position: both the banker and the 
borrower are speculating that by the end of the project there will be enough money to repay the 
loan, despite some shortfalls along the way. A bank loan officer with good expertise in credit 
assessment will accept such loans.
5 
 
Finally, when the cushion of safety is non-existent and there is a high probability of 
shortfalls in nearly every period, the firm may have to borrow additional funds just to meet 
current commitments. Minsky calls this “Ponzi” financing, making reference to a well-known 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Brian Arthur (1994) have stressed. Indeed, in this context the idea of “best practice” may be without 
analytical content.  
5 In Minsky’s terms, Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are always speculative units, and true Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs are quasi Ponzi units. 
  3post-war pyramid investment scheme. These are companies that must increase their borrowing 
just to stay in business; according to standards of good credit assessment, bankers should not 
lend to such units under any circumstances (Kregel, 1997c). For Ponzi units, profits expectations 
are based solely on the possibility of the resale of assets at higher prices. 
 
Building on Keynes and Schumpeter, Minsky argues that in a capitalist economy in 
which the future is subject to unforeseen changes, the value of hedge and speculative financing 
positions changes with variations in the overall macro behavior of the economy. For example, a 
change in economic policy that produces a rise in interest rates affects firms’ financing positions 
in two ways: it reduces the present values of the expected cash flows from operating projects; 
and it increases the cash flow commitments for financing charges if interest rates are set on an 
adjustable or rollover basis.  
 
3. A Schumpeterian View of Finance, Innovation, and Growth 
 
  The innovative competitive reactions discussed above, insofar as they require additional 
expenditures, all can be undertaken only if they can be financed. This was a key link in 
Schumpeter’s vision of the process of economic growth. Schumpeter considered finance as the 
motor force of industry; only with financing can firms appropriate the resources necessary to 
introduce innovations (Schumpeter, 1934 [1997]), ch. 3, and 1939 v. 1, ch. 3).  
 
  Enlarging Schumpeter’s perspective involves identifying the characteristics of banks or 
of other financial firms that lead them to play this role in the innovation/growth process. This 
means accounting for the existence of banks and other financial firms within the economy. In the 
contemporary economic literature, many different rationales for the existence of banks have been 
established. One set of explanations attributes banks’ existence to the advantages of large-scale 
operations per se. Banks may arise because they specialize in the investment of depositors’ 
funds, and thus are more efficient than households in acquiring information about potential 
investment opportunities and hence in earning returns through the placement of savings. Banks’ 
existence can also be explained by their scale advantages in monitoring the performance of 
borrowers. A more recent explanation attributes banks’ existence to their involvement in 




  These approaches, while elaborating on banks’ use of scale economies in achieving 
informational advantages, do not explain the unique role that Schumpeter attributed to the 
institutions financing the innovation process. The above explanations could also be used to 
explain the existence of money market mutual funds, which offer transactions and transfer 
facilities to their clients but make no loans (Mayer 1974), or the existence of collateral-based 
lenders. It might be more useful to begin with the two archetypal activities of the commercial 
bank: credit creation through lending to business firms in support of productive economic 
activity; and the proprietary purchase and sale of financial assets to benefit from pricing 
differentials that occur at a point in time or over time.
7 These two activity types are significant 
                                                           
6 For a recent summary of this literature, see Freixas and Rochet (1997).   
7 Such trading may be beneficial in that it provides liquidity in financial asset markets; however, the 
spillover benefits of such proprietary trading are greatest when markets are buoyant and do not lack 
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while the latter has no impact on the absolute level of income 
 
Productive lending in the sense suggested by Schumpeter in his Theory of Economic 
Development (published in its first, German, edition in 1911) provides firms with access to the 
resources they require to undertake production. Lending of this type requires particular 
knowledge of the production process, costs, and future market conditions for the products 
produced by each firm to which credit is extended and thus of its prospects for repayment. It 
facilitates the activities of the high return, knowledge-absorbing sectors that produce dynamic 
industrial growth (in the same vein, see Minsky: 1990, pp. 60-65). 
 
Management of the bank’s proprietary investment portfolio, by contrast, requires 
information about the formation and evolution of prices in various securities markets; this 
process may have no relation at all to the information required to make decisions on lending to 
industrial borrowers. The motivation for such activity is, according to the theory of efficient 
markets, based on the idea that arbitrage in free competitive markets can eliminate any 
differences in the prices of identical titles to expected future income streams traded as financial 
assets. The impact of financial arbitrage is limited to the static efficiency of the competitive 
market process: it forces uniformity in market prices and helps allocate given resources to their 
optimal risk-return combinations. The successful arbitrageur profits from the elimination of such 
differences by being early to recognize them; by contrast, the successful borrower profits from 
the organizational or managerial innovations that grant the firm a dominant market position. 
 
Both types of knowledge-based activity are carried out by many commercial banks. 
When carried to extremes, they are reflected in the two basic organizational forms characteristic 
of financial institutions: relationship or house banking; and competitive market-based activity, 
sometimes known as “transactional” banking. In the former, the knowledge advantage possessed 
by the bank involves its clients’ production activities, and the potential profitability of these 
activities in producing the earnings needed to pay debt service and repay principal. This type of 
bank operation is usually associated with German Kreditbanks; US investment banks have 
historically played a similar role, although in a slightly different context and on a reduced scale 
(cf. Madeleine, 1943, Robertson, 1955, 1964, Hammond, 1967). Indeed, German banks often 
employed engineers and scientists to help evaluate the technology and thus the long-term 
prospects of borrowers to fully exploit knowledge-based advantages. 
 
One characteristic of relationship banking is that it does not permit free market 
competition among banks for business; no firm would willingly provide the proprietary 
information required for a banking relationship to a financial institution if it thought that 
institution might be working for a competitor in the near future. For full information sharing 
between bank and borrower, confidentiality in the treatment of information must be present; this 
implies the exclusivity of the services provided by the bank. Neither would a firm be willing to 
offer all the information necessary to allow permit a number of competing banks to make 
competitive bids for its business. By contrast, financial arbitrage -- the basis of most of the 
transactions activities of banks -- is based on knowledge of particular characteristics of the 
payment flows represented by financial assets, the prices of these assets that prevail in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
liquidity, and least when markets are under pressure and traders are seeking liquidity.  
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places. One might say that the relationship bank is speculating on the nominal profitability of an 
innovative industrial process embodied in the firm that it is financing, while the transactional 
bank is speculating on its ability to identify anomalies in the efficient operation of the market 
mechanism and the on the capacity of market competition to eliminate these anomalies. 
 
In this regard it is important to remember that although financial institutions have certain 
peculiar characteristics and function in a special regulatory environment, they are nonetheless 
business firms and compete much like other firms. So just as the industrial structure is driven by 
competition, financial institutions seek to earn profits from the exploitation and protection of the 
various knowledge-based advantages they have acquired. That is, organizational and production 
advantages will produce dominant competitive positions which can only be challenged by firms 
capable of reproducing innovations, or of perfecting other techniques that are more attractive to 
the market and hence more profitable (Burlamaqui and Lagrota, 1998, section 5). 
 
As already mentioned, in financial systems where main banks or house banks provide 
relationship services, there is a tacit agreement, as well as a practical imperative, that banks do 
not compete for business. By contrast, market-based systems, wherein the required knowledge 
involves markets or instruments, but not information about clients, present the possibility of 
financial innovations via rapid reverse engineering. This permits the competitive emulation that 
provides for eminently contestable markets; financial institutions will compete for business by 
seeking to replicate the financial instruments and services that other institutions offers to their 
clients. Competition of this type can encompass either the direct confrontation of competitors or 
the expansion of activities into other sectors or areas of the production process. As the 
introduction of new information processing technology increases organizational capacity, and 
enhances economies of both scale and scope, financial firms can integrate additional services 
into their activities.
8 The creation of financial firms capable of this activity requires the evolution 
and concentration of financial institutions and financial markets to a size that is sufficient to 
achieve similar economies of scale and scope.
9 Note that this growth in financial firms’ capacity 
makes it possible for non-financial firms too to achieve greater economies of scale and scope.  
 
4. A Minskyian View of Banks, Finance and Liquidity 
 
  For Minsky, as well as for Schumpeter, debt financing is the core of the very logic of 
capitalist production. In exploring the link between finance and economic activity, Minsky shifts 
attention away from the problem of productive credit and focuses on the problems of liquidity 
and credit overexpansion. His work belongs to the Post-Keynesian approach to economics, a 
perspective that takes money and finance (rather than technology or innovation per se) as the 
most important organizational features of capitalist systems. The Post Keynesian view 
emphasizes the crucial importance of uncertainty and liquidity preference in understanding the 
multiple rationalities for, and the volatility that guides, investment decisions; it also explores the 
                                                           
8 For example, the process Chandler (1990, 28) describes -- wherein producers that achieve sufficiently 
large scale expand to provide wholesale and retail distribution of their outputs, thus internalizing external 
markets and eliminating wholesale and retail distribution costs -- has a counterpart in financial services.  
9 Mayer (1988, 1992) shows the impact of these changes in the organization of financial firms on the 
operation of financial markets. 
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incorporate real world phenomena - and specially finance - into the core of economic analysis, 
so as to grasp the intrinsically unstable nature of capitalist economies. 
 
  Minsky’s “Wall-Street Paradigm” develops a theory of endogenous macroeconomic 
instability by connecting the dynamics of debt structures and interest rates. According to Minsky, 
modern capitalism could only be understood via this approach, which he explained as follows:  
 
“Looking at the economy from a Wall Street board room, we see a paper world - a 
world of commitments to pay cash today and in the future. These cash flows are a 
legacy of past contracts in which money today was exchanged for money in the 
future. In addition, we see deals being made in which commitments to pay cash in 
the future are exchanged for cash today. The viability of this paper world rests 
upon the cash flows (or gross profits after out-of-pocket costs and taxes) that 
business organizations, households, and governmental bodies receive as a result 
of the income-generating process” (Minsky, 1982, chapter 3, p. 63).  
 
  In his vision, understanding money means understanding a vital process shaping a social 
evolution whose future course remains open-ended and contingent. In this sense, Minsky’s 
theory should be taken as an essentially institutionalist one, in the sense that he viewed the 
structure of the economic world - much as did his former teacher Schumpeter - not as immanent 
in some set of underlying data (such as endowments or technology) but rather as constituted by a 
set of key economic institutions. Money was the most important of these. His way of fleshing out 
that idea was to look at every economic unit – firms, households, governments and even 
countries – as though it was a bank balancing cash inflow generated by a stock of assets against 
cash outflows required to maintain the liabilities created to acquire those assets. From that point 
of view, categories of activity such as production, consumption, trade and investment represent, 
first of all, exchanges of stocks of real and financial assets with particular monetary flow 
characteristics and attached conditions. To put it bluntly, money and finance are the most real 
aspects of capitalism, from everything else springs. 
  
  In this approach, the most basic element of the economy is cash flow, and the most basic 
constraint on economic behavior is the “survival constraint,” which requires that cash outflow 
not exceed cash inflow if existing stock positions are to be maintained (Minsky: 1978, 157). 
Because the exact coordination of payments is impossible, even this simple constraint involves 
finance. From that perspective, finance and financial relationships are fundamental because they 
oxygenate economic units, allowing them to purchase without previous savings; and they make 
growth and structural transformation possible, by providing current purchasing power to those 
who would use it to expand the boundaries of the system. 
 
  However, in Minsky’s thinking, finance has a double-edge quality. The other side of the 
“positive” roles mentioned above is that finance allows economic units to become illiquid in the 
present (by way of cash commitments) in exchange for the possibility of recovering liquidity 
(plus profitability) in the future; specifically, it permits these units to acquire assets whose 
expected cash-flows will exceed the cash commitments entered into to acquire them. Thus 
finance allows the undertaking of future commitments that may turn out to be impossible to 
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cases, of insolvencies and bankruptcies. 
 
  The subjectivity and volatility of expectations thus make financial asset prices more 
volatile than other prices in the economy (Keynes: 1936 [1983] chapter 12, Strange: 1998). 
Secondly, given the inherent volatility of financial asset values, liquidity provides an important 
“protective device” or “defensive strategy” to manage uncertainty, for two reasons. First, since 
money is the unit of account its value is less volatile and more certain in terms of other goods 
than other financial assets; thus it represents a refuge from price volatility. Second, it provides 
assurance that future cash commitments can be met with certainty. Thus firms whose incomes 
flows are subject to fluctuation may want to hold cash cushions to make sure that they can meet 
recurrent cash commitments. This is the basis of Minsky’s theory of financial fragility:  
 
“The liquidity preference schema of Keynes transformed economics into a study of 
intertemporal relations: not only is the future now but the past is also now. After Keynes, 
there was no reason to do economic theory that was presumably relevant for a Capitalist 
economy without examining the relations in production, consumption and finance that 
link yesterdays, today and tomorrows.” (1990: p. 6) 
 
  Commercial banks face a series of risks, the most important being liquidity or funding 
risks. Commercial banks fund their lending by borrowing from the public by issuing sight 
deposits, which may be redeemed at any time. If the bank has lent these funds to a commercial 
borrower it will have to attract alternative lenders in order to avoid calling in loans. It may not 
always be able to do so; indeed, its liquidity or refunding risk arises because at times it may lack 
the liquidity to repay its liabilities and to renew this lending by finding other depositors. If the 
commercial bank is lending to business it also faces credit risk, for the firms that have borrowed 
from the bank may not be able to repay on a timely basis. The bank will have become what 
Minsky calls a speculative unit – that is, a unit whose required interest payments exceed its 
earnings -- and it will find difficulties in attracting additional deposits. Finally, a bank that funds 
lending at interest by issuing liabilities on which it has made a commitment to pay interest, must 
make sure that the positive differential (net interest margin) between the rate on its liabilities and 
the rate on its assets is maintained. If the term or the reset rate of the interest on the liabilities is 
shorter than that of the assets, the bank faces market or interest rate risk. Should the rate it has to 
pay to attract funds exceed the rate at which it has committed to lend, then a loan is subject to net 
present value reversal, and the bank will make losses and be unable to meet its commitments.  
 
  It is thus extremely important for a bank to present itself to its depositors as a hedge-
financing unit that is able to make payments to its creditors on demand with perfect certainty. 
This would seem to imply holding a cash cushion against potential deposit withdrawals of 100% 
of the deposits, and this would imply that the bank could do no lending. But commercial banks 
do make business loans, so the question is how it does this without incurring unmanageable 
risks. The term “unmanageable” here means without running the risk of becoming a speculative 
unit and being unable to meet depositors’ withdrawal requests. So, although banks will incur 
both liquidity and credit risks, they seek to make them manageable by fully hedging these risks 
(Kregel 1998d, ch. 7).  
 
  8  We may see how this might be done by considering an archetypal commercial bank that 
only makes short-term commercial and industrial loans of less than 90 days that are over-
collateralized against goods in warehouse or contracts for sale of outputs. In this case, the value 
of the loan is some fraction of the anticipated realization value of the collateral. So if a borrower 
fails to repay, the bank takes possession of the goods and sells them for an amount equal to the 
value of the loan. Manageability here means making loans that are less than 100 per cent of the 
total value of the property pledged as collateral.  
 
  Bankers can calculate with reasonable certainty the amount of their total deposits that 
have to be repaid in the course of any given day. At the same time, banks can arrange their 
lending so that the total loans repaid each day equals the cash turnover requirement. This 
minimizes the amount of cash that has to be available to meet cash outflows. Since these 
calculations are only statistical probabilities, they have a margin of error. Thus bankers maintain 
a cash cushion or liquidity reserve that can be used when net outflows of funds are positive, as 
frequently occurs. Usually this reserve against deposits has averaged much less than 10%. When 
the value of collateral is less than loan value, the bank’s owners can if necessary fall back on 
their capital to make payments to depositors. Thus, for average daily operations a bank can 
“safely” lend a relatively large multiple of its capital and of its deposits, with its risks fully 
hedged by the value of the collateral, its cash reserve cushion and the bank owner’s capital. As a 
result, banks are usually very highly leveraged -- with gearing and deposit multipliers well in 
excess of 10 to 1 -- without being considered excessively risky. In this way a bank can maintain 
a hedged balance sheet that protects it from becoming a speculative unit (in Minsky’s sense).  
 
  However, hedging the risks of a highly leveraged balance sheet does have an opportunity 
cost, however, since one main source of bank earnings, given a positive lending differential, is 
the multiple by which the bank can create deposits by lending in excess of the deposits it has 
borrowed from the public. To increase this ratio beyond that associated with the hedging of risk 
means increasing the probability that the liquidity and capital cushion will be insufficient to meet 
repayment requests -- and hence the probability that a liquidity crisis and a loss of confidence 
could produce insolvency due to demands for repayment in excess of reserves and capital 
resources. Thus banks also face a trade-off between risk and liquidity, which translates into a 
tradeoff between profitability and liquidity.  
 
  Notice that the decision on how to hedge the various risks depends on the subjective 
perception of these different risks and the values of the collateral pledged against loans; the type 
and degree of hedging will thus be representative of the bank's liquidity preference. A decision to 
expand credit lending through additional deposit creation, other things being equal, is thus a 
decision by the bank to reduce its liquidity cushion and either an explicit decision to increase 
risk, or a subjective revaluation of the bank’s position that reduces the perceived risks faced by 
the bank or increases the collateral values pledged against loans. For example, a more optimistic 
evaluation of the resale value of collateral will allow a bank to increase its lending but not its 
perceived risk. In this case, the reliability of the new estimate of collateral value is crucial.  
 
  Consider the case of Japanese banks, which generally grant loans on the basis of 
collateral valuation. As the property market boomed after the Louvre Agreement in 1987 led the 
Japanese authorities to reduce interest rates, Japanese banks either lent to or created their own 
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were being driven up by the increased demand for property, which was fueled by purchases of 
the property companies. Since many of these companies were quoted on the stock exchange, this 
increased lending to property companies fueled a rise in their stock market value and the creation 
of investment companies which qualified for bank lending because of the rise in the stock market 
value of the property companies. A vicious circle was thus created, in which the banks fueled 
both a property and a stock market boom without increasing what appeared to be fully hedged 
and thus manageable risks. When interest rates were increased and the markets turned in 1989, 
the banks’ exposures could not be reduced to restore collateral coverage to acceptable levels and 
the loans effectively became valueless. 
 
5. Competition, Regulation, and Innovation in Banking  
 
The two previous sections spell out some of the dynamics of banking behavior, from two 
complementary theoretical perspectives. How then do banks compete? The first wisdom here is 
that banks compete differently depending on the state of their own balance sheets and the state of 
the economy as a whole. When financial institutions are competing aggressively they seek to 
maximize their market share; but when faced with difficulties they restrict their market 
expansion and compete for liquidity and/or solvency. As a result, competition in banking carries 
an inbuilt tendency to underestimate risks when the economy is expanding at a steady and 
seemingly predictable pace, and to overestimate them when the economy is in decline. It is the 
former that is more dangerous for the survival of the bank, and that constitutes the banking 
sector’s contribution to the overall uncertainty and instability of the economy as a whole.  
 
In the United States, this sort of process of banking competition culminated in the stock 
market crisis of 1929 and the banking crisis of 1933; in that crisis, a majority of US banks 
became insolvent due to a liquidity crisis that turned into insolvency, as described in Minsky’s 
theory. Regulations were then introduced, based on the real bills doctrine, which attempted to 
institutionalize commercial banks and to limit their operations in financial markets to 
transactions services and short-term commercial lending (Kregel, 1996, Chapter 5).  
 
  To avoid such crises, most countries have introduced formal regulations, in the form of 
compulsory reserve ratios and minimum capital ratios, which impose bank hedging and thus 
create uniform standards for bank liquidity. Central banks in some countries have accepted the 
responsibility of acting as lender of last resort: that is, they stand ready to advance credits against 
a bank’s doubtful assets in an emergency, thereby allowing banks to meet payment commitments 
even when they are in a speculative position and lack the liquidity to meet depositor withdrawals. 
 
  However, this governmental oversight has not protected commercial banks from 
competition with other providers of financial services. Indeed, in the past three decades, a 
competitive struggle has been waged between financial institutions facing different types of 
financial regulation. Banks have lost business to financial institutions that were not so highly 
regulated. The regulations covering commercial banks have limited their use of financial 
innovation to protect their deposit base and thus their net interest margin on normal lending 
activity. Thus, commercial banks have initiated primarily counter-regulatory innovations; and 
these have led banks to expand their activities in new directions.  
  10 
  This process began in the United States when a credit crunch and regulations on capital 
flows introduced during 1960s balance of payments and dollar crises created incentives for US 
banks to shift some of their borrowing operations out of the United States to “off shore” markets, 
primarily London. In addition to providing new sources of dollar funding for US banks, these 
markets provided an environment free of the segmentation imposed by US bank regulation. 
Commercial banks could thus operate internationally much like investment banks in the US, 
making many US bank global players, dealing in financial assets from around the globe.  
 
  Then in the 1970s, savings and loan institutions started to compete with banks by offering 
to pay interest (and in some cases a free toaster or mink coat) on transactions deposits, while 
commercial banks remained restricted to zero interest deposit accounts. Since regulations apply 
to reserve ratios and interest rates payable on deposit funds, banks innovated by seeking new 
sources of funds not technically classified as deposits. This was the primary source of 
competitive innovation in the 1970s and early 1980s (Mayer, 1974); competition within classes 
of depository instruments remains fierce today. Within each regulatory class, the competitive 
pressure is extreme: the products that a bank uses to decrease its required reserves or regulatory 
capital (and hence increase its earnings) are easily replicated through reverse engineering 
techniques that are widely known in the markets and sold publicly to clients.
10 
 
  Further, by the late 1970s, a large share of banks’ traditional lending to corporate 
borrowers passed to more efficient forms of organization, such as commercial paper and money 
market mutual funds. Banks responded by branching out into areas such as term lending, and 
they deepened their involvement in offshore lending and other activities. This led to a series of 
lending crises involving overseas loans, one consequence of which has been the establishment of 
minimal risk-weighted capital/asset ratios. 
 
  Overall, these shifts have caused banks’ most important source of earnings, the net 
interest margin between borrowing and lending rates, to decline dramatically. To meet earnings 
shortfalls, commercial banks have been forced into other areas of activity, such as providing 
financial services to generate fee and commission income, and engaging in proprietary trading of 
financial assets (Kregel, 1996, 1998). These shifts have fundamentally altered bank behavior.  
 
  As noted above, proprietary trading by commercial banks requires a different type of 
information than does conventional lending. Earnings from financial arbitrage are based on the 
knowledge of prevailing market prices, and of the prices that other financial market participants 
expect to prevail. This shift toward fee-based income has altered the kind of information that 
banks collect, and the relative value of market-based and firm-based information within banking 
firms. Further, the introduction of risk-weighted capital-asset ratios led banks to create new types 
of assets that either have lower risk weightings or do not appear on bank balance sheets at all 
(hence requiring no capital). The result has been a rash of new product innovation in which 
banks act as market makers in derivatives products. 
                                                           
10 Two examples make this point. The negotiable CD, offered to business clients by First National City 
Bank was quickly offered by all commercial banks to their clients. The securitization of bank assets 
through special purpose vehicles was pioneered by Salomon in mortgage banking after the collapse of the 
savings and loans, but was soon extended to other assets.  
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  These new activities represent substantially different types of risk and different tradeoffs 
between risks and returns, with a likely overall increase in risk. Proprietary trading, for example, 
carries large price risks which banks have not traditionally been accustomed to manage (Strange: 
1998, chapter 2). An average US commercial bank now generates roughly one third of earnings 
from lending on net interest margin, a third from its proprietary trading portfolio and a third from 
fee and commission income. The latter is especially important because it carries a zero capital 
charge and virtually no liquidity or credit risk. 
 
  Finally, much bank lending is now securitized into collateralized loan obligations, which 
banks sell to final investors so as to move loans off their balance sheets. This frees up bank 
capital; it also generates fee and commission income from booking the loans and from 
underwriting and selling the securitized packages. Lending to firms is being done increasingly 
through derivative packages arranged by banks and sold to bank clients, often with banks 
themselves taking the opposite side of the hedges or providing subsidiary guarantees (that also 
are off balance-sheet). Thus, the new activities that banks are creating to protect earnings is 
transforming their package of risks and making it much more difficult to identify appropriate 
“margins of safety”. Further, innovations involving derivative contracts frequently shifts risks. It 
is usually argued that this process shifts risks to those who are most willing to bear them. But 
since identifying the true risks of derivative instruments is difficult, it cannot be assumed that 
those most able to bear these instruments’ risks are bearing them. This generates yet another 
source of potential financial instability. Overall, it is readily seen that these innovative products, 
practices, and strategies in the banking system have not only reshaped, but also deepened, this 
system’s tendency towards financial fragility. 
 
  In Schumpeterian terms, continuous product innovation is required for banks to create 
monopoly profits, conquer new clients, and improve competitive position against other banks. 
Financial product innovation diffusion occurs almost instantaneously, since patent protection is 
difficult to attain and information is rapidly diffused (by product imitation) among institutions. 
Thus, first-mover profits are ephemeral: once created, they almost instantaneously evaporate 
(Burlamaqui and Lagrota, 1998, part 5, Burlamaqui 2000, pp 12-19). Consequently, much 
competitive innovation has taken the form of rapid bank consolidation: it is easier to buy 
competitors than to gain a dominant advantage over them, and the gain in size leads to hoped-for 
gains from economies of scale and scope. Since 1980, consolidation has occurred rapidly both 
within and across regulatory classes (Dymski, 1999). In 1999, US banking legislation opened the 
way for consolidation across financial product lines, thus removing the regulatory classifications 
that have driven much of the competitive activity in the financial sector over the last thirty years. 
 
6. Globalization and Financial Fragility 
 
  How is our analysis affected when we consider the increasingly important global context? 
To begin, for firms with a high proportion of imported inputs, export sales, or foreign borrowing; 
depreciation of the exchange rate will have the same effect on cash flow commitments as an 
increase in interest rates. For countries operating in an open trading system these two exogenous 
changes usually occur together and reinforce one other, since higher interest rates are often used 
to stabilize a weak currency after devaluation.  
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  Cash cushions or margins of safety thus are necessarily larger for firms operating in 
countries with open capital markets and uncontrolled capital flows (Kregel, 1997c and 1998a).  
For some borrowers, safety cushions will not be large enough to cover exogenous changes in 
both interest rates and exchange rates; these units may be transformed immediately from “hedge” 
finance units to “Ponzi” finance units. Shifts that reduce borrowers’ cushions of safety also 
increase lenders’ credit risk on their outstanding bank loans. Firms’ borrower’s risk also 
increases as they find it more difficult to realize the cash flows they initially expected. Overall, 
the fragility of the domestic financial system increases with either a rise in interest rates, or a 
depreciation of the currency.  
 
  Obviously, this same reasoning can be applied to domestic banks that borrow or lend in 
international capital markets. They will require higher cushions of safety against possible 
changes in international interest rates or in exchange rates. A bank with international operations 
is also exposed because a rise in interest rates and depreciation of the exchange rate also reduces 
the present value of its cash flows from domestic assets (represented by the interest payments 
received from its outstanding domestic loans), increases the interest costs of its foreign funding, 
and reduces the credit quality of its domestic loans. Any of these shifts reduce the bank’s credit 
rating as a borrower, and force it to pay higher credit spreads on its domestic and international 
funding. If the change in rates is sufficiently large, banks may also find themselves suddenly in 
the condition of a Ponzi unit; in this case, banks’ net present values fall below zero and 
institutions in this position become technically insolvent. 
 
 
                                                          
Banks’ response to such conditions – especially if their own funding sources refuse to roll 
over or extend credits -- is to reduce lending to firms that are classified as hedge and speculative 
units, and calling in loans to Ponzi financing units. If domestic banks are also unwilling or 
unable to lend, the domestic inter bank market will also contract, and a generalized liquidity 
shortage will arise. As both firms and banks attempt to reduce their foreign currency exposure, a 
breakdown in the foreign exchange market may also occur. In this manner, cross-border financial 
linkages can readily transform a financially fragile system into a financially unstable system. 
 
  The consequences of these financial shifts can be dire. As noted, the special 
characteristics of speculative and Ponzi firms is that they need increased finance from the banks 
just to stay in business. In such conditions, Ponzi financing firms have no choice but to reduce 
their own cash outflows, delaying current payments to suppliers, cutting back on expenditures, 
and by attempting to raise cash in any way possible -- selling out inventories and any output they 
can produce at distress prices. If these measures are not sufficient to cover their cash flow needs, 




11 Perverse macroeconomic consequences can readily follow: a generalized condition of excess supply in 
all markets, placing downward pressure on prices of both output and assets, accompanied by declining 
overall demand. In extreme cases, investment can decline due to tightening monetary policy, and 
consumption can fall because of declining household incomes and increased unemployment. Ironically, 
these developments may place additional pressure on short-term money markets, and even push short 
rates upwards as credit conditions deteriorate, current payments are delayed, and more units seek 
temporary financing to keep operating.  
  13  Any number of factors, and not just shifts in exchange rates, can generate the scenario 
just outlined: among these are the tendency toward underestimation of risks in periods of 
sustained economic stability, periods of epochal Schumpeterian technological changes which 
increase optimism regarding the profit potential of new technologies, and so on. Significant 
balance-sheet exposure to foreign markets – either through loans or goods – reduces the size of 
the external shock required to trigger financial stress. Further, a period of prolonged exchange 
rate stability may in itself lead to over-optimism regarding the stability of the domestic currency 
values of foreign commitments, tempting units to reduce the margins of safety they maintain on 
foreign commitments. This endogenous change in margins makes the passage from a fragile to 
an unstable system that much more rapid in the event of an exogenous shock. 
 
  However, every period of tranquility and every technological revolution is interrupted; so 
expectations are eventually disappointed, challenging financial and non-financial units alike. 
Irving Fisher warned of a combination of events in which rising supplies and falling prices leads 
to a collapse in demand – a process he termed a “debt deflation.” Minsky modified Fisher’s 
description, placing more importance on the rising credit risks on bank balance sheets; increased 
charge-offs and a general decline in asset quality result, placing some banks in difficulty as their 
capital cushion is overwhelmed by loan losses, and a full fledged financial panic is threatened. In 
Minsky’s model, this spread of fragility from the productive to the banking sector characterizes 
the passage from financial fragility to financial instability and crisis.  
 
  The Special Fragility of Developing Countries. Minsky’s original analysis of the 
passage from financial fragility to financial instability focused on changes in domestic monetary 
policy or the persistence of stable domestic conditions. This analysis is easily extended to the 
open economy case of an exogenous exchange rate shock, which affects companies operating in 
open trading systems and banks borrowing and lending in international money and capital 
markets. With increasingly interdependent capital markets and increased capital flows, the 
analysis of changes in monetary policy should be extended to encompass changes in the 
monetary policy of the largest international lenders.  
 
  Changes in interest rates of the major international lenders, especially the US and Japan, 
have been especially important in creating financial instability in developing countries during the 
debt crises of the 1970s and 1980s; their impact on exchange rates has been a major factor in the 
1997 Asian financial crisis. However, that crisis was exacerbated by an additional element: the 
conditionality imposed on the borrowers seeking support from the multilateral agencies (Kregel, 
1998a, 1998b and 1998c). 
 
  As noted above, the normal scenario for a developing country financial crisis involves 
domestic firms borrowing in foreign currency from foreign banks at interest rates that are reset at 
a short rollover period. Note that it makes little difference if the loans have a short or long 
maturity; the point is the change in interest costs on cash flows produced by the short reset 
interval for interest rates. Short reset periods mean that a rise in foreign interest rates is quickly 
transformed into an increased cash-flow commitment for the borrower, instantly reducing 
margins of safety. If the change in international interest rate differentials leads to a depreciation 
of the domestic currency relative to the borrowed foreign currency, then the cushion of safety is 
further eroded by the increase in the domestic currency value of the cash commitments and the 
principal to be repaid at maturity.  
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  Developing-country governments sometimes respond to the weakness of the domestic 
currency in international markets by increasing domestic interest rates, with the aim of stemming 
currency speculation or increasing foreign demand for the currency; however, such policy steps 
adversely affect domestic demand, reduce domestic cash flows, and increase domestic financing 
costs. Firms may thus pass rapidly from hedge financing to Ponzi finance units as the result of a 
rise in foreign interest rates. Whether this increase in financial fragility turns to instability and 
crisis depends on the willingness of foreign banks to extend additional foreign currency lending 
to cover payment shortfalls on current commitments. If foreign banks follow the bankers’ 
aphorism, they may be unwilling to do this.  
 
  As a result, firms may be forced to try to improve their foreign earnings by increasing 
foreign sales. But this usually leads to falling prices in international markets, compounding 
losses from depreciation of the exchange rate; any cutback in domestic operations simply makes 
domestic demand conditions worse. The knock-on or contagion effect thus hits both the domestic 
financial system and the foreign banks, which now have increasingly dubious loans on their 
books. If foreign and domestic banks’ capital cushion is insufficient to absorb the losses, then 
fragility turns to global systemic instability. In any case, the initial shock and the recommended 
policies combine to increase fragility and thus make instability possible in any exchange rate 
crisis. 
 
  For the economy as a whole, overall risks are spread over a larger base, as there are more 
households than investment banks. Since households are generally limited to lower leverage in 
financing their asset holdings than financial institutions, they are less likely to experience 
insolvency as a result of price risk. This suggests that the important characterizing feature of a 
financial system is the distribution of risks across types of banks and households, rather than 
whether finance is accomplished via the market or bank intermediation. The policy conclusion is 
then that intervention to separate banks’ activities is not the decisive step in ensuring or 





  From this “Schumpeterian-Minskyian” political economy of finance framework we have 
tried to develop here it is possible to draw some policy implications. Firstly, it suggests that 
much policy discussion, contrasting the stability of segregated and mixed-bank regulatory 
structures, has been misplaced. From the point of view of Schumpeterian “creative destruction” 
or Minskyian “endogenous financial fragility” a certain amount of evolutionary instability is 
necessary to allow the competitive innovation that makes the system viable. When banks and 
other financial institutions provide the financial resources that lead to successful innovation by 
some firms, they will also be financing firms whose competitive strategies are unsuccessful. 
Perfectly safe and stable banks would mean stagnant economic development. It thus seems clear 
that the major objective of policy cannot be the elimination of change and instability, for this 
would eliminate economic development. Rather, policy should be directed towards ensuring 
financing of innovative capital projects.  
 
  15  Secondly, it follows that the role of policy should be to prevent the endemic systemic 
instability that can cause reversals of capital flows and changes in financial prices (and lead to 
Minsky-Fisher debt deflations) by providing for appropriate integration of financial institutions 
and markets. This should involve several major areas. One is risk management. As seen above, 
the major activity of banks is risk management, not undertaking the risks of maturity 
mismatches. A second policy focus should be on monitoring the manner in which risks are 
shifted from financial institutions to other balance sheets, primarily those of the public. This puts 
emphasis on the provision of market liquidity. Households will be more willing to hold long-
term assets if some of their price risk is offset by their ability to sell these assets at short notice in 
liquid markets. This liquidity, in turn, depends on the activity of financial institutions serving as 
market makers, either directly or indirectly. Their ability to make markets depends on their 
financing, in particular on their gearing or leverage ratios. In sum, policy must focus on risk 
management techniques of financial institutions, the manner in which this risk management 
shifts risks to balance sheets outside the financial sector, the provision of market liquidity, and 
the degree of leverage of balance sheets. 
 
  Finally, from our  political economy of finance perspective , those changes in policy 
should not be expected to come from mere “agreed rationality” or technical consensus, but rather 
from political struggle where  politicians consciously seek to influence policy in adapting to their 
own beliefs and their constituents interests, or as a set of institutional innovations steaming from 
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